China’s 21^stCentury Internment Camps in the Uyghur Region 

Table of Content 

 

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary......................................................................................................... 3

Naming Convention....................................................................................................................................................................... 3

II. Introduction:.................................................................................................................... 5

The Uyghur Region........................................................................................................................................................................ 5

Under Chen Quanguo’s Hands................................................................................................................................................ 7

Internment Camps in China....................................................................................................................................................... 9

Internment Camps under the Transformation through Education (TTE) system........................................ 9

III. Current Overview of Internment Camps in the Uyghur Region.................................. 12

3.1    Who are the Detainees of China’s 21^stCentury Internment Camps?............................................. 12

“Suspicious” and “Untrustworthy”................................................................................................................................... 13

Prominent Uyghurs............................................................................................................................................................... 15

Uyghur and Kazakh Students Abroad........................................................................................................................ 16

Uyghurs and Kazakhs who travelled abroad........................................................................................................ 16

Uyghurs and Kazakhs with Families Abroad......................................................................................................... 16

3.2    Estimated number of people targeted for interment: 3.9 million................................................... 16

3.3 Network, Structure and Capacity of Internment Camps........................................................................... 19

Camps Network, Structure and Capacity................................................................................................................ 19

Prison-like Conditions of Internment Camps....................................................................................................... 20

Technology and Social Re-engineering................................................................................................................... 21

IV. Potential Implications of Internment Camps.............................................................. 22

4.1      Regional Implications............................................................................................................................................... 22

4.2      Global Implications.................................................................................................................................................... 23

V. Callings.......................................................................................................................... 24

VI. Appendix...................................................................................................................... 25

Population Statistics and Estimated Detainees: by County and Prefecture.......................................... 25

Selected Satellite Images of Internment Camps....................................................................................................... 30

References........................................................................................................................................................................................ 33

 

 

 

I. Executive Summary

 

In recent months, journalists, human rights activist, diplomats and Uyghur communities around the world have desperately called attention to the sweeping expansion of internment camps in the Uyghur region of the People’s Republic of China. To date, an estimated 3.9 million Uyghurs and Kazakhs are detained in China’s internment camps in the Uyghur region. Detailed estimates are included in the appendix section of this report.

 

The unprecedented level of repressive measures implemented across the Uyghur region, especially through the use of mass internment camps, should alarm not only China’s neighbors, but also the global community. Despite China’s lack of acknowledgement or transparency around its internment camps, abundant amounts of evidence continue to surface. Massive camp construction efforts have been documented, witnesses have told their stories, and recent news media coverage, satellite images, and statistical data points sufficiently demonstrate China’s on-going massive interment campaign. 

 

One of the main objectives of China’s internment camps in the Uyghur region is to dilute Uyghur cultural identity, and in Xi’s own words, “to enhance Uyghurs’ sense of identity with China, the Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party and socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Moreover, the region’s vital role in China’s Belt-and-Road initiative is making Beijing hell-bent on pursuing what it sees as a definite solution in addressing the “Uyghur issue.” By indiscriminately subjecting large swaths of Uyghurs to extensive extrajudicial detentions, humiliating brainwashing procedures, and inhumane living conditions, China is effectively on carrying out ethnic genocide against Uyghurs on an unprecedented level. 

 

The horror in the Uyghur region is not a China issues, it’s a global issue. The responsibility to stand up against China’s inhuman treatments of Uyghurs and its effort to carry out ethnic genocide against them falls on the global community. The pursuit of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is not exclusively an American right, it is a universal right bestowed on all of mankind. 

 

 

Naming Convention

 

Some refer to these internment camps as “re-education camps,” following the Chinese name given, which translates as “transformation through education,” but there is nothing educational about them. Instead, these camps are used as grounds for the compulsory indoctrination, humiliation, and torture of the Uyghur population; with local officials describing their purpose to be “eradicating tumors” or “killing the weeds.” Therefore, mislabeling these internment camps as “re-education camps” not only camouflages their intended purpose, but also undermines the tragic pre-genocidal reality facing Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities today. These camps should be labeled for what they are – internment camps, as they are used to detain political prisoners, members of Uyghur, Kazakh, and other ethnic minority groups for “reasons”of state security, exploitation, or punishment. Throughout this report, the facilities used by China to mass detain millions of people will be called for what they are – Internment Camps.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

II. Introduction:

The Uyghur Region

 

The Uyghur region – home of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kirgiz, and other Turkic-language people – is crucial in China’s economic, military and social ambitions. Sparsely populated and known for its superior production in oil and gas, the region has been the site of heavy army and police concentration since colonization by China’s Communist regime in 1949. According to official statistics released by the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional (XUAR) Statistics Bureau in 2016, the total population in the Uyghur region is roughly 25 million, of which Uyghurs make up about 45.6% (or 11.4 million); ethnic Han Chinese 38% (9.5 million); and Kazakhs 9 percent (2.2 million). The region is also home to a number of other ethnic groups, including Turkic-speaking groups such as Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Tatar, as well as non-Turkic-speaking groups like Hui, Mongols and Russians. 

 

Not only is the Uyghur region considered to be China’s biggest domestic producer of oil and gas, much of the fuel imported from Central Asia and Russia also pass through the infrastructure embedded in the region. The region is a vital link in the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s boldest foreign policy to date and aims to bind the Middle East and Europe to the country through ties of infrastructure, investment and trade. 

 

During the 1990s, China became increasingly concerned about the potential of a Uyghur national liberation movement, especially following the fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting independence of the Central Asian states in 1991. Since Uyghurs are ethnically and culturally more similar to the people of neighboring Central Asian (rather than China’s ethnic Han majority), the paranoid Communist regime began regularly launching repressive campaigns in the Uyghur region, which were justified as measures to maintain “national security” Measures included proliferations of Han migrants in the region, as well as increased security and military presence in the region; arrests of hundreds and thousands of Uyghurs suspected as “separatists;” censorship of non-official information, including publications, music and other artistic forms of expression that the Communist regime viewed as promoting Uyghur identity.

 

Following September 11, 2001, China swiftly rebranded its repressive campaigns in the Uyghur region to align them with what had become a popular discourse of a Global War on Terror (GWOT). By linking its policies suppressing Uyghurs as part of a global effort to counter terrorism, China significantly bolstered its efforts to crackdown on the Uyghur and other Muslim inhabitants of the region. This widespread crackdown resulted in scores of arrests on falsely claimed charges related to terrorism, many carrying death sentences. The GWOT also allowed China to justify its Islamophobia. Mosques across the Uyghur region were constantly raided and eventually shut down, draconian measures were employed to limit people’s daily activities and life rituals that incorporated Islamic or Uyghur elements – such as prayers, weddings, funerals etc. Contrary to China’s rhetoric however, scholars and experts have repeatedly pointed out that there were no viable Uyghur terrorist threat that existed within China’s borders, including the Uyghur region, during the early 2000s. Nevertheless, since late 2000s, China’s draconian policies in the Uyghur region, its repressive measures targeting allUyghurs as a “potential threat” to society and its blatant discrimination against them created an fertile environment for increasing violence. 

 

On July 5, 2009, massive riots and ethnic clashes broke out in the capital city Urumqi, sparked by Uyghur youths protesting the inhumane treatment of Uyghur migrant laborers and the State’s inadequate response to such workers being attacked and killed in southern China. The 2009 riots resulted in hundreds of deaths (both Uyghurs and Han), thousands of arrests (more than 4,000 Uyghurs were arrested within two weeks of the event), and the enforced disappearance of thousands of Uyghurs accused of being involved in the riots. The entire region came under lock-down for an entire year, during which the government shut down the internet throughout the region, restricted cellphone text messaging and blacked all international calls.

 

By 2010, over 40,000 high-definition surveillance cameras with riot-proof protective shells were installed throughout the region. Heightened efforts to monitor and control the general Uyghur population also included additional military troops and security personnel, “volunteer” security officers to monitor all public spaces, numerous newly-established “checkpoints,” and frequent widespread security sweeps in local Uyghur communities and neighborhoods. Passing through these checkpoints can mean anything from the having one’s identification card scanned to having iris-recognition technology pierce into one’s eyes – depending on how “suspicious” or “untrustworthy” one appears to the security personnel staffing the check-point. To enforce its grid-management system in the Uyghur region, China has been flying in troops, parading police convoys through each city, township, and village, and heavily investing in cutting-edge technology. Despite being littered with security cameras, shops, restaurants, and bazaar stalls in predominantly Uyghur cities such as Hotan and Kashgar are required to have a part-time policeman on duty. 

 

Starting 2013, Uyghurs who applied for new passports for blatantly denied and many of those holding an existing passport had theirs confiscated. Between April – October 2015, the ruling Communist Party committees in Uyghur region directed all residents to turn in their passports to local police stations. The order was followed by another directive in June requiring all applicants for passports and other travel documents to supply DNA Sample, fingerprints, a voice-print sample, and a 3D body scan image. While these new rules seemed ostensibly universal, restrictions on passports have strictly targeted ethnic minorities, making it harder for Uyghurs and other ethnic groups to book overseas vacations or go on the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. By 2016, all residents of the region were ordered tosubmit their passports to the Public Security Bureau for “safekeeping,” further restricting Uyghurs’ freedom of movement.

Under Chen Quanguo’s Hands

 

Since Chen Quanguo became the region’s new Communist Party Secretary in late 2016, unprecedented repressive measures have been taken against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other ethnic minorities in the region. Drawing on his experience as Party Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region and with the help of modern technology, Chen has pioneered the most heavily policed region in the world, which he proudly characterized as “grid-style social management.”

 

An unprecedented system of finely-gained mass surveillance targets Uyghurs in their every move. Security checkpoints, often labeled “convenience police stations,” are erected every few hundred yards, completed with anti-riot equipment, metal detectors, face and voice recognition software, and iris scan machines. 

 

Throughout the region, Chinese authorities have initiated random examination of Uyghurs smartphones – both at security checkpoints and through spyware installed in virtually all smartphones in the region. Uyghur storeowners are required to install password activated security doors, panic buttons, and cameras, all of which security organs have full access to. The network of street surveillance cameras throughout the region has not only expanded in number, but have also grown more sophisticated through facial recognition systems and artificial intelligence capabilities. A biological database populated with DNA information of Uyghurs has been established to complement information collected on Uyghurs from other sources of surveillance.[1]

 

Even within their homes, Uyghurs can not escape China’s intrusive and inhumane surveillance tactics, for Chen has also established ways to monitor, track and control the private lives of Uyghurs, as well as their thoughts and beliefs. Heavy surveillance is enforced upon all private communications through China’s particularly sophisticated Internet surveillance apparatus, which patrols and collects big data on Uyghurs on the web. In rural areas, tracking of private lives also involves Chinese authorities and party officials regularly paying visits to or living with Uyghur families. All residents of the Uyghur region, including Uyghurs, are called upon to monitor and report on neighbors behaviors, thoughts, beliefs and activities – with an incentive of 2000 - 5 million Yuan ($260  - $730,000), depending on the usefulness of information reported. According to government advertisements in Hotan, a majority Uyghur prefecture in the Uyghur region, the smallest rewards (of 2000 Yuan) is given for reporting on “face coverings and robes, youth wearing long beards, or other popular religious customs…”

 

Data collected through various means of electronic, biological, and human surveillance are aggregated by China’s Public Security Bureau in the Uyghur region to establish a “predictive policing” program known as the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform.” The system is intended to create an all-encompassing means of tracking, monitoring and controlling all Uyghur residents of the region, including not only their record of activities and behaviors, but also their thoughts and beliefs as gleaned from their web activities, electronic communications, physical appearance, and their reported interactions with peers. In addition to predicting future activities deemed “disloyal” by the Communist regime, the system also allows for post-facto punishments of past transgressions by Uyghurs, which may be considered a “threat” by the state not only in present times but also in the future. 

 

Measures adopted under Chen have not only targeted individual Uyghurs as “threats” but the entire population of Uyghurs. Since 2016, Uyghur government officials and party members have also come under great scrutiny. Majority of Uyghur state officials have been labeled “two-faced” people, accused of sympathizing with extremist and terrorist activities. In Hotan, nearly 100 party cadres were punished for failing to report on suspicious activities in their areas and for under-reporting the number of people attending the local mosque, attending or hosting weddings, funerals and other life events outside of officially designated locations. Prominent Uyghur officials, intellectuals, scholars, artists,  as well as wealthy entrepreneurs have been targeted especially in areas densely populated with Uyghurs. In January 2018, for example, four of the wealthiest businessmen in the city of Kashgar were arrested on counts of “religious extremism.”

 

Under Chen, China’s most recent efforts in targeting ethnic Uyghurs is the on-going operation of mass extra-judicial interment camps through the region, deceptively labeled “re-education camps.” Local informants, media sources, and accounts of a few individuals who managed to escape these internment camps paint a picture of 21^stcentury style prison where detainees are subjected to monotonous and regimented daily routine, inhuman treatments and torture. Reports have also surfaced on individuals falling ill or passing away due to the horrific conditions of these camps. 

 

These internment camps represent China’s latest efforts in de-humanizing, controlling and eventually exterminating the entireUyghur population, which the Communist regime has branded as a “threat” to China’s “harmonious society.” Aside from its superior technological capabilities, China’s mass internment camps throughout the Uyghur region are identical to some of the well-known examples of concentration camps in the twentieth century in its mass character and purpose of isolating and quarantining a specific population. As Sean Roberts puts it in his most recent article on the issue, entitled “The Bio-politics of China’s War on Terror and the Exclusion of Uyghurs,” China’s internment camps in the Uyghur region reflect “perhaps the clearest example of how the PRC’s counter-terrorism policies toward the Uyghurs since 2016 have taken on an exclusionary character that verges on characterizing them as Homo Sacer– outside of civilized society and the protection of the law.”

Internment Camps in China

 

China’s tools of suppression have grown dramatically both in terms of their sophistication and capacity. The most inhumane tools - such as those involving forced indoctrination, torture, and murder – are all pooled into the form of internment camps. Since their first use under Mao’s Communist regime to punish counter-revolutionaries, China’s internment camps have expanded both in its capacity to hold detainees and in its technological capabilities. The system of internment camps under Mao – the Reform through Labor system ( RTL), also known as the Laogai system - was established in 1950s as part of the formal prison system, and inmates are convicted through legal proceedings. The RTL system primarily targeted “counter-revolutionaries.” The Re-education through Labor system (REL) system, on the other hand, came into existence in 1957 as a extrajudicial administrative penalty and internment system that operates outside of the formal prison system. The REL system targets political dissidents, petitioners, human rights activists, Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, and Tibetans among others.

Internment Camps under the Transformation through Education (TTE) system

 

The Transformation through Education (TTE) system was established in early 2000s, partly in response to the growing international attention on the inhuman conditions of REL, which was officially abolished in 2013 though continued informally in practice. Similarly, the TTE system is completely extrajudicial and detains the same groups of people targeting under the RTL and REL systems. In addition, China also uses TTE to detain and coercively “convert” anyone who is considered to have a “non-conformist” or “backward” mindsets. The TTE system operates alongside the official prison and detention system, wherein prison inmates are sometimes sent to TTE camps to be “re-educated,” or TTE camp detainees are sentenced to prison after a period of time in camp. 

 

As early as 2013, reports of “transformation through education” system in the Uyghur region began surfacing. In August 2013, a District in Turpan City reported that it was undertaking “transformation through education work” in order to punish those wearing veils, growing facial hair, or wearing ethnic clothes. At the time, “re-education” was implemented in a localized fashion such as personal visits to private homes by government officials and mandatory “study sessions.”

 

Since then, the application of “transformation through education” in the Uyghur region rapidly proliferated along with China’s various “anti-terrorism” and “de-extremification” campaigns in the region. Beginning April 2017, massive detentions of Uyghurs and Kazakhs began throughout the Uyghur region following the publication of the Xinjiang Autonomous Regional Government’s (XUAR) “de-extremification regulations” (新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例). Directive no. 14 in section 3 of this document states that: 

 

"De-extremification must do transformation through education well, jointly implementing individual and centralized education, jointly implementing legal education and supporting activities, thought education, psychological counseling, jointly implementing behavioral correction and skills education, jointly implementing transformation through education and care for the person [lit. humanistic concern], strengthening the outcome of transformation through education."

 

Another influential document in the development of China’s internment campaign in the Uyghur region is a research paper published in June 2017 by Xinjiang’s Urumqi Party School, which argues that the present time represents a “golden” opportunity for intensive “re-education measures,” following the 3-year “strike hard” campaign and the “one-year stable residence” campaign initiated by Chen Quango in October 2016. 

 

The current Political-Transformation through Education (PTE) system carried out in the Uyghur region resembles the TTE in its extrajudicial process and operations alongside the formal prison system. However, the intended purpose of the PTE system is much more ambitious and its structure much more sophisticated, partly thanks to technology. In the Uyghur region, the PTE system is implemented as a network of camps labeled “re-education centers,” “re-education bases,” and “re-education schools” (see Table 1 for different names used for PTE camps), all of which operating alongside regular prison and detention centers.[2]

 

Figure 1 – Development of China’s Internment Camps (1950s – Present) 

* Re-education-through-Labor (REL) system was officially abolished in 2013, though China continued the practice informally

 

Table 1 – Selected Names used to disguise PTE camps in the Uyghur Region

 

Political-Transformation-through-Education(PTE) 2013– Present
职业发展中心 (Zhiye Fanzhang Zhingxin)	Career Development Canter
去极端化教育转化中心 (Quji duanhua jiaoyu zhuanhua zhongxin)	De-extremification though Education Transformation Center
法制培训学校 (fazhi peixuen xuexiao)	Legal System Training School
集中教育转化 (jizhong jiaoyu zhuanhua)	Centralized Transformation through
教育转化中心 (Jiaoyu Zhuanhua Zhongxin)	Education Transformation Center
去极端化教育培训中心 (Quji duanhua jiaoyu peixun zhongxin)	De-extremification Education & Training Center
去极端化教育培训中心 (Quji duanhua jiaoyu peixun zhongxin)	De-extremification Education & Training Center
学习班 (Xue-xi Ban)	Study Class
教育改造 (jiaoyu gaizao)	Educational Transformation
康复矫治中心 (Fuyuan jiaozhi zhongxin)	Rehabilitation Correction Center

 

 

III. Current Overview of Internment Camps in the Uyghur Region

3.1      Who are the Detainees of China’s 21^stCentury Internment Camps?

 

Uyghurs and the Piloting of China’s Social Credit System (SCS) 

 

The main criteria for selection of detainees for internment are based on ethnic and religious identities. There are no known reports of ethnic Han Chinese being placed in internment camps in the Uyghur region, only members of Uyghur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and other ethnic minorities. With respect to religious identities, Chinese government officials openly discuss the need to “cleanse” rural villages with majority Muslim populations. In 2015, Xinjiang's justice department's party committee secretary stated that in a typical (Muslim) village, 30% are "polluted by religious extremism" and therefore need to be engaged in “concentrated education...work” in order for the village to be “cleansed.” A public official in Khotan County argued that of those who are “polluted,” 5% were the “hardened” faction and 15% supporters of those who are “hardened.” 

 

Countries with large Muslim populations – such as Egypt, Malaysia, and Turkey, have become “off-limits” for Uyghurs, and those who have previously visited such countries have come under great scrutiny and at times accusations of receiving “extremist” Muslim indoctrination. In many cases, family members and friends of those who have travelled to Turkey or are still in Turkey have been targeted and taken to internment camps. 

 

Following the primary criteria above, police and government officials evaluate the “trustworthiness” of residents in the Uyghur region based on a numerical scoring system that deducts points based on various identity elements and actions that are deemed “suspicious” or “threatening to national security.” For instance, subjects receive an automatic 10% deduction in “trustworthiness” for being Uyghur. Additional points are deducted for engaging in “illegal religious activities or “displaying signs of “extremism.” The system used to evaluate residents in the Uyghur region is in part a pilot of China’s Social Credit System (SCS) – which is designed to value and engineer individual behavior by establishing the “scores” of citizens. The SCS pilot scheme in the Uyghur region targets those who are considered “suspicious,” “untrustworthy” or pose “threats” to the Communist Party’s rule. Since launching, China has used SCS (alongside various oppressive measures) in the Uyghur region as a weapon to legitimize its targeting of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities under the disguise of promoting “social stability.” The SCS system is expected to be fully implemented across the nation by 2020, and has already been used in parts of China (other than the Uyghur region) to ban citizens with low scores from using various public infrastructures such as railways and aviation.

 

In the Uyghur region, China’s SCS pilot project is complemented with a man-powered system called Fanghuiju, which sends teams of half a dozen—composed of policemen, Party leaders and local officials – to visit from house to house across rural townships, and villages compiling dossiers of personal information. In 2017, over 10,000 fanghuiju teams were sent to rural areas to report on “extremist” behavior such as notdrinking alcohol and fasting during Ramadan, as well as the presence of “undesirable” items in each household such as Korans and banned Uyghur scriptures. 

 

China’s “becoming kin” system, in which local families (mostly Uighur) “adopt” ethnic Han officials, and receive “family visits” from them regularly, sometimes living in the same household for a short period. These government officials officials also verify information collected by fanghuiju teams on their “adopted family.” According to an official report in 2018, 1.1m government officials have been paired with 1.6m Uyghur families since the inception of the “becoming kin” system. Moreover, large forces of people are employed by the government to work as “eyes” to identify “suspicious” individuals within their social circles, neighborhoods and community. In January 2018, RFA spoke to Public Security Officials who work as “eyes” for the communist party, some of whom boasted about reporting over 50 individuals who displayed “suspicious behavior” to Chinese authorities.

 

While government officials monitor Uyghurs within their households, technology maps their activities street by street and phone by phone. In every city, township and village with majority Uyghur population, eight to ten video cameras are installed at intervals of 100-200 meters. Cameras are equipped to work day and night, detecting and identifying pedestrians, car number plates, as well as the face of the person driving them. Only registered owners may drive cars; anyone else will be arrested, according to a public security officials. Recent media reports surfacing indicate that Chinese surveillance chiefs began testing a facial recognition system that alerts authorities when targets stray more than 300 meters from their homes or workplace.

“Suspicious” and “Untrustworthy”

 

This finely grained surveillance net comprising both human and artificial intelligence, is deployed throughout the Uyghur region with its greatest force in the southwest, where around 80% of residents are Uyghurs, effectively identify “suspicious” and “untrustworthy” individuals to be sent to internment camps.

 

Table 2 listsselectedidentity elements and activities that are considered to be “suspicious,” “illegal,” and or display signs of “extremism.” All of these elements and actions have been documented as causes for detentions in internment camps. 

 

 

 

Table 2 – Identity Elements and Actions documented as causes for internment
Identity	State-determined category
Belong to an ethnic minority group, including Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kirghiz	Suspicious/Untrustworthy
Under 40 (born in 1980s and 1990s)	Violent generations/ Untrustworthy
Being Muslim	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Being related to a “black-listed” individual	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Being related to an individual with foreign citizenship	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Being related to an individual living in a pre-dominantly Muslim country (i.e. Egypt, Malaysia, Turkey, etc.)	Suspicious / Untrustworthy Religious extremism
Former prisoners who are already released	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Activities
Connections/communication abroad[3]	State-determined category
Expressing interest in traveling abroad	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Encouraging others to travel abroad	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Traveling abroad for any reason (e.g. education, tourism)	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Receiving a phone call from abroad	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Maintaining contacts overseas, such as family members and friends who live or study abroad	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Uyghur cultural practices	State-determined category
Uyghur writers and artists who have in some way promoted Uyghur ethnic identity in their work	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Possessing unapproved books, literature or sermons	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Attending (or have previously attended” certain “prohibited” sermons	Suspicious / Untrustworthy; Religious extremism
Political Expression	State-determined category
Expressing a critical opinion of the ruling Chinese Communist Party	Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Holding views are considered to be insufficiently aligned with Party doctrines (i.e. Uyghur government officials, journalists, critics, intellectuals)	“Two-faced Persons”  Suspicious / Untrustworthy
Religious practices – Strong Religious Views	State-determined category
Praying 5 times a day	Religious extremism
Praying with feet apart	Religious extremism
Previously taken the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca (Haj)	Religious extremism
Previously travelled to a predominantly Muslim country that’s considered to be “off-limits” to Uyghurs (i.e. Egypt, Malaysia, and Turkey)	Religious extremism
Wearing clothing attire that resemble Islamic clothing (e.g. long skirts, scarves, hijabs, niqabs and burkas)	Religious extremism
Having facial hair	Religious extremism
Buying a tent	Religious extremism
Quitting cigarettes	Religious extremism
Abstaining from alcohol beverages	Religious extremism
Abstaining from eating pork	Religious extremism
Fasting during the month of Ramadan	Religious extremism
Owning a Quran – physical or electronic copy	Religious extremism
Naming children Islamic names	Religious extremism
Taking part in life ceremonies (e.g. marriage, death, etc.) using religious rather than legal procedures	Religious extremism
Organizing minors into attending religious activities	Religious extremism
Daily (Other) Activities	State-determined category
Disposing of mobile phone SIM cards	Suspicious
Infrequent use of mobile phone after registration	Suspicious
Being unemployed	Suspicious and untrustworthy
Homeschooling one’s children

In addition to the identity elements and actions above, certain groups of Uyghurs and Kazakhs are specifically targeted for internment, including:

 

Prominent Uyghurs

In addition to the identity elements and causes mentioned above, prominent Uyghurs who are regarded as being influential – such as celebrities, musicians, artists, entrepreneurs, as well as those regarded as thought leaders – such as intellectuals, professors, authors, and poets have been targeted for enforced disappearance or detained in internment camps. 

 

Uyghur writers and artists who have in some way promoted Uyghur ethnic identity in their work are especially targeted for internment or enforced disappearance. Examples include the famous Uyghur folk musician Abdurehim Heyit, who was taken away to an internment camp in Urumqi in 2017; Uyghur pop music start Ablajan Awut Ayyup, who disappeared in February while on his way to Urumqi following a recording trip in Shanghai; and Erfan Hazim, one of the best Uyghur professional soccer players who was arrested and detained following his visits to Dubai and Spain to train and take part in soccer matches.

 

One of the most respectable and influential Uyghur religious scholar, Muhammad Salih Hajim, was taken to an internment camp in Urumqi along with his daughter and other relatives in late 2017. In January 2018, it was reported that the 82-year-old scholar who is known for translating the Quran from Arabic to Uyghur had deceased while in custody. 

Uyghur and Kazakh Students Abroad

Since April 2017, Chinese authorities have ordered Uyghurs studying abroad in countries including Egypt, Turkey, France, Australia, and the U.S. to return home, and have subsequently detained some of them in internment camps across the Uyghur region. Returning Uyghur students have been arrested and taken to internment camps in order to  be “cleansed” of ideology that endangers state security. 

 

Over 200 Uyghur and Kazakh students holding Chinese passports were targeted in July 2017 by Egypt's secret police in an operation requested by Beijing. Many of the students were attending Cairo’s Al-Azhar Islamic University, and were rounded up in restaurants or at their homes, with others seized at airports as they tried to flee to safer countries.

Uyghurs and Kazakhs who travelled abroad

Uyghurs and Kazakhs who are detained at interment camps after having travelled abroad will first be interrogated camp staff about their impressions and how the experience had changed them. Following interrogations, detainees are held indefinitely until they admit that it was “wrong” to have left the country. Those who have travelled to Central Asia or predominantly-Muslim countries come under additional scrutiny for having been influenced by “extremist” views. 

 

Uyghurs who have previously travelled abroad for any reason are put on “black-lists,” making them easy targets for interment camps. Often times, family members of black-listed individuals also come under great scrutiny as they are deemed “untrustworthy” and/or “suspicious.”

Uyghurs and Kazakhs with Families Abroad

Uyghurs and Kazakhs with family members abroad – despite the citizenship status of such relative, are targeted as “suspicious individuals” especially if there is an open line of communication (whether by phone or via the internet). For instance in September 2017, RFA reported that police in Arshang (in Chinese, Wenquan) County of Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture detained an unknown number of local people including farmers, herders, students and government officials, who had relatives living across the border in Kazakhstan, and were detained for the alleged offense of "discussion of how to emigrate to Kazakhstan on group chat."

 

Currently, an estimated 3.9 million Uyghurs and Kazakhs are targeted as detainees for internment. Estimates are based on population statistics and arrest quotas set by Chinese authorities in the Uyghur region. Areas with highest shares of arrests are those with large shares of Uyghur and/or Kazakh populations, including Kashgar, Hotan, and Aksu prefectures. The following section details the methodology used in obtaining these estimates. 

3.2      Estimated number of people targeted for interment: 3.9 million

 

Earlier this year, Maya Wang of Human Rights Watch, an advocacy group, reckoned the overall number detained may be 800,000. Timothy Grose, a professor at Rose-Hulman University in Indiana, puts the total between 500,000 and 1m. Adrian Zenz, a lecturer in social research methods at the Germany-based European School of Culture and Theology, also stated that the number of detainees in interment camps “could be closer to 1.1 million, which equates to 10-11 percent of the adult Muslim population of the region."  
 

Since April 2017, local authorities from multiple counties across Hotan Prefecture, where Uyghurs make up 97% of the population have informed RFA about a 40% internment quota set by higher-level authorities. Experts suggest that similar orders have been given in other areas of the region, and that authorities are detaining as many Uyghurs (and Kazakhs) as possible, regardless of age, occupation, prior service to the Communist party or the severity of accusations against them. 

 

In March 2018, Local officials in Ghulja County, Ili Prefecture, where Uyghurs and Kazakhs each make up about 30% of the population, told RFA that authorities had order 10% of residents to be sent to internment camps.[4]Relying on these qualitative information collected by Radio Free Asia (RFA) Uyghur Service, we make the following assumptions about internment quotas based on ethnic population makeup of each county in the Uyghur region. 

 

Internment Quota	Criteria
40%	Counties in which Uyghurs and Kazakhs make up more than 90% of the population
30%	Counties in which Uyghurs and Kazakhs make up 70 – 90% of the population
20%	Counties in which Uyghurs and Kazakhs make up 50-70% of the population
10%	Counties in which Uyghurs and Kazakhs make up 30-50% of the population
5%	Counties in which Uyghur and Kazakhs make up less than 10 - 30% of the population
0%	Counties in which Uyghur and Kazakhs make up less than 10% of the population

 

Applying these assumptions to the population statistics of the Uyghur region published by the Xinjiang Bureau of Statistics in 2016, we estimate that nearly 4 million Uyghurs and Kazakhs are targeted as detainees for internment. Estimates are highest for areas with the large shares of Uyghur and/or Kazakh populations, with an estimated 1.6 million residents in Kashgar prefecture subjected to internment; followed by over 868,000 residents in Hotan prefecture; and over 626,000 residents in Aksu prefecture. A complete table with estimates for each county is included in the Appendix. 

 

These estimations corroborate anecdotal claims that the number of detainees in the region’s south—where the highest concentration of Uyghurs are based—far surpasses that in the north. For example, in a village later visited by Agence France Presse in Qaraqash county, near Hotan, a fifth of adults had been detained over four months. 

 

Figure 2. Uyghur Population in the Uyghur region

 

 

 

3.2 

3.3 Network, Structure and Capacity of Internment Camps

 

The substantial body of PRC governmental sources that prove the existence of the camps also provide clues about camp capacity, camp equipment capabilities, and conditions within interment camps. Capacity of internment camps has been reported to hold anywhere between 300 - 3,000 detainees.[5]

 

In May 2018, Dr. Adrian Zenz of the European School of Culture and Theology in Germany presented a detailed empirical analysis of internment camps in the Uyghur region. Using information from 73 government procurement and construction bids valued at nearly 700 billion RMB (approximately USD 108 million), along with public recruitment notices and other documents, Dr. Zenz provided an unprecedented insight into the evolution and extent of the region’s interment campaign. Satellite images (see appendix) further illustrate the incredibly speedy pace at which internment camps are being constructed across the Uyghur region.  In addition to the construction of new internment camp facilities, efforts to upgrade and expand existing facilities have been documented. In many cases, public schools, manufacturing plants, and other facilities have been re-purposed as internment camps. 

Camps Network, Structure and Capacity

 

China's central government authorities have not publicly acknowledged the existence of internment camps in the Uyghur region, and the number of inmates kept in each facility remains a closely guarded secret, as is the number of internment camp facilities. However, local officials in many parts of the region have in RFA telephone interviews forthrightly described sending significant numbers of Uyghurs to the camps and even described overcrowding in some facilities.
 

The current internment system in place in the Uyghur region is based on a sophisticated network of dedicated internment facilities, organized by a three-tiered “re-education system in which interment camps are established at county, township and village levels. The three-tiered system was first established in November 2014 in Konasheher County or Kashgar Prefecture, and was likewise mentioned in a 2017 government research paper, whose ideas found widespread adoption throughout China’s internment campaign in the Uyghur region. Furthermore, RFA interviews with local informants as well as government bid documents analyzed by researchers such as Adrien Zenz corroborate the existence of such facilities at city, county, township and village levels.

 

The Uyghur region, under the administration of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional government, consist of 119 city-level, prefectural and county level administrative units, along with 1,097 township-level administration units and over 11,000 village –level administrative units. If the three-tier system is fully implemented, and with the assumption of 1-internment-camp per city, county, village, and prefecture level administration, the number of internment camps in the Uyghur region would be 12,216.

 

In reality however, the number of internment facilities in areas with predominantly Uyghur population far exceeds 1-per-city or 1-per-county. For instance, satellite images reveal that in Akto County alone, where Uyghurs and Kazakhs account for a combined 70% of the total population, there are at least 6 internment facilities. Similarly, local sources indicate that there are at least 4 internment camps in Kashgar city alone, with the largest being a recently re-purposed middle school. Government bids for internment facilities over the last year reveal that over 600 million RMB was spent in Kashgar prefecture alone to cover interment camp related costs. In Hotan prefecture, at least 340 million RMB was spent over the last year to cover expenses related to constructing or upgrading internment camps and facilities. 

 

Assuming that each facility would on average host 250 to 880 detainees (though some facilities hold up to 3,600 people and reports of overly crowded facilities have surfaced), which is broadly in line with the Urumqi Party School research paper's suggestions, government bid data and informant reports, the overall capacity of the internment system ranges between 3 million to 10.75 million. 

 

Prison-like Conditions of Internment Camps

 

Despite the deceptive and wide-ranging names given to internment facilities – such as Transformation-through-Education Center, Vocational Skills Education and Training Center, County Transformation-through-Education School, etc., what they resemble are prisons rather than schools. 

 

Internment camps across the Uyghur region are fortified with barb-wired security fences, bomb-proof surfaces, full-coverage surveillance equipment such as cameras and audio transmitters, watch-overs, guard rooms, and facilities for armed police force. The use of “military-style” management and “strict course schedule” are implemented throughout all internment camps to effective carry out compulsory indoctrination. 

 

Accounts by a few individuals who managed to escape internment camps provides descriptions of life in China’s internment camps. Inmates are permitted to leave their assigned compartments within camps only to use restrooms, for which they must be accompanied by at least one police officer or camp security personnel. 

 

Daily routine in internment camps begin at 5 a.m. with detainees washing up using limited water and washing space. Camp guards then begin making their inspection rounds to check detainees beds to ensure that they are properly made. One steamed bun per detainee is given for breakfast at 6 am, following which detainees are ordered to march through the campground chanting cadences in Chinese: “Train hard, study diligently.” 

 

Propaganda films are played featuring state-appointed religious leaders who explain the differences between legal and “illegal” religious practices, and skits demonstrating the consequences of engaging in “illegal religious activities.” Warnings about such consequences are also displayed on large posters outside every religious site in the region. Following mandatory propaganda videos, detainees are served lunch (one steamed bun and vegetable soup) and are permitted to “rest” on their platform beds, though laying down is forbidden. Afternoons consist of more marching, chanting, and propaganda videos, and detainees are order to sleep at 6 p.m. (8 p.m. Beijing time). Other activities demanded of camp detainees include singing patriotic songs, actively taking part in “self-criticism” and “repenting” sessions, and sitting through lectures on Xi Jinping “thought,” Chinese language, Chinese law, and the dangers of Islam.

 

Detainees are held in internment camps indefinitely and without any formal charges. Some are released within a few days or weeks, while others are passed on to a “higher-tier” internment camp or sentenced to prison. Several accounts of detainees dying in interment camps have been reported, including a 17-year-old Uyghur boy who was taken to an interment camp in Kashgar following his vacation to Turkey. 

Technology and Social Re-engineering

 

Innovation and technology has bolstered the sophistication of China’s totalitarian determinations, as exemplified by the modern technology embedded throughout its interment camps across the Uyghur region. China’s Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), which uses machine learning systems combined with information attained from surveillance cameras, smartphones, financial and medical records, as well as reports by the thousands of Chinese officials deployed to monitor residents  to generate lists of suspects for detention. 

 

High-resolution cameras that leave “no dead angles,” voice IP communication technology, and other cutting-edge technology are embedded in internment camps to monitor every move of detainees. Data points collected are then transmitted through the Integrated Information Collection Platforms (IICP) to police and authorities at each level to be analyzed and acted upon. 

 

 

 

IV. Potential Implications of Internment Camps

4.1      Regional Implications

 

The targeting of the entire population of Uyghurs as “terrorists,” along with the on-going cycle of repression-violence-repression,[6]has led to Uyghurs’ de-facto exclusion from legal rights as well as universally acknowledged basic human rights. Uyghur live in a constant state of intense surveillance not placed on any other groups in Chinese society. Regardless of efforts by Uyghurs to demonstrate their loyalty to the Communist regime, and such efforts have been made by many to preserve their own wellbeing, they remain under scrutiny as “potential terrorists” unless they literally condemn their Uyghur identity and ethnic heritage. In the eyes of the Chinese government, all Uyghurs are deemed a threat to the party’s social orders - guilty of terrorist or extremist inclinations, until proven innocent. As a result, the cycle of repression-violence-repression is likely to continue and intensify.

 

The social ramifications of China’s internment camps are both pervasive and destructive. Amid the detentions, Uyghur women and children are being forced to endure heavy labor to make up for wages lost by the men in their families who are held in re-education camps. Uyghur children whose parents or guardians have been detained in the camps are being held in government-run ‘orphanages’, both inside and outside of the Uyghur region as overcrowding has forced authorities to send them to facilities in the country’s inner provinces. Anecdotal accounts also describe children under 5 being left behind in empty homes, with surrounding neighbors hesitant to help or care for them so as to avoid scrutiny from the authorities. State-run orphanages are being built rapidly across the region, where children who were abandoned involuntarily by their parents (who are now internment camp detainees) are abducted and brought to be State officials. 

 

Drawing on writings of Michael Foucault, Sean Roberts describes the gradual exclusion of Uyghurs as an expression of biopolitics where the Uyghur people as a whole have come to symbolize an almost biological threat to society that must be quarantined through surveillance, punishment, and detention. This depiction is even more alarming against the backdrop of the proliferating crematoriums rapidly being constructed across the region, where Uyghur and other ethnic minority corpses are being brought directly by security officials with zero involvement of family members. To be clear, these Crematoria are being built to literally extinguish not only Uyghur corpses without acknowledgement, but also Uighur funeral traditions (which insists on burials). 

 

4.2      Global Implications

 

Communist regimes from Romania to North Korea have long considered internment camps as a core instrument for achieving social control. Today, China is using this very same instrument, albeit significantly more sophisticated and technologically advanced, in hopes of achieving total control of the Uyghur region and its residents. However, given the region’s importance to China’s Belt-and-Road initiative and its other socio-economic and military ambitions, the extent of brutality China is willing and capable of employing across its internment camps are unprecedented. 

 

As pointed out by James Millward and Adrian Zens, we would do well to ponder whether what is happening in the Uyghur region will stay in the Uyghur region. For starters, the fact that a core region of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is littered with internment camps should worry the global community. It’s no secret that through the one road one belt initiative, China intends to secure it’s military presence and economic dominance across BRI countries. The infrastructure being built by China, including roads, railways and ports are said to contribute to economic development in the region. However, they also serve to benefit China’s military capabilities, as they enable Beijing to secure an effective means for communication and the movement of troops in a contingency. Moreover, China has been using its position on the U.N. Human Rights Council and the U.N. Security Council not only to stifle discussion of its actions, but also to attempt to rewrite international human rights to allow expansion of these practices by any dictatorship with the means.

 

At the moment, China’s draconian policies and repression against Uyghurs continue to be exported around the world. Families of U.S. citizens who speak out against Beijing, including its interment of their family members are targeted as part of the Beijing’s effort to silence all international criticism. Many Uyghur journalists at Radio Free Asia, including Gulchehra Hoja – who testified before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China on July 26 of this year, have had more than dozens of family members (including elderly and children) arrested and detained. 

 

Just as the Uyghur region has become China’s testing ground for its “Social Credit System,” it has also become a laboratory for China’s use of cutting-edge surveillance technology. China’s surveillance efforts have already infiltrated many parts of the globe, and most recently such efforts have involved Uyghurs who are citizens or residents of countries in Europe, North America and beyond. So far, China’s new-found global political and economic clout has allowed the Communist regime to ignore growing international outrage over its policies in the Uyghur region, and instead continue to criminalize and de-humanize Uyghurs for reasons none other than their identity. 

 

 

 

V. Callings 

 

 

We call on the Chinese government to end its repressive policies in the Uyghur region and free all those arbitrarily detained. 

 

We call on China to immediately end all forms of arbitrary detention, and ensure that laws protecting detainees are brought in line with international human rights standards.

 

We call on the Chinese government to grant Uyghurs their basic and fundamental human rights.

 

We call for all nation states around the world, including its people and governments, to continue calling out the atrocities in the Uyghur region in a public and direct manner, as top U.S. officials and lawmakers have done recently.

 

We call for the U.S. administration to impose sanctions on senior Chinese officials responsible for human rights abuses in the Uyghur region, including Chen Quanguo, under the Global Magnitsky Act. 

 

We call for U.S. corporations to stop selling China technological equipment and items that can be used for repression, including DNA technologies and video surveillance tools. 

 

We call for international-led investigations into the Uyghur region to investigate the locations of and conditions inside interment camps, as well as the health and wellbeing of those arbitrarily detained in them.

 

We call on western democratic countries to protect the Uyghurs living within their borders, who are continuously being harassed by China in numerous ways.

 

We call on western democratic countries to assist the Uyghur diaspora in their efforts to communicate with their families, relatives and peers living in the Uyghur region.

 

 

 

 

VI. Appendix

 

Population Statistics and Estimated Detainees: by County and Prefecture
	County/District/City
Prefecture Level	County/District/City	Chinese Name	Total	Uyghur		Kazakh		Combined Total	% of Population	I* Rate	Estimated Detainees
Urumqi City	Urumqi City	乌鲁木齐市	2,668,315	339,951		63,780		403,731	15%	---	27,911
	Dabancheng District	达坂城区	41,329	2,387		6,839		9,226	22%	0.05	461
	Mido District	米东区	287,202	10,278		4,708		14,986	5%	0	-
	Shaybak District	沙依巴克区	551,498	57,698		7,448		65,146	12%	0.05	3,257
	Shinshi District	新市区	641,248	40,348		3,887		44,235	7%	0	-
	Bulaqtagh (Shuimogou) District	水磨沟区	292,172	30,344		3,015		33,359	11%	0.05	1,668
	Tengritagh (Tianshan) District	天山区	572,556	176,527		11,978		188,505	33%	0.1	18,851
	Tudunghaba (Toutunhe) District	头屯河区	219,419	21,427		1,635		23,062	11%	0.05	1,153
	Urumqi County	乌鲁木齐县	62,891	942		24,270		25,212	40%	0.1	2,521
Aksu Prefecture	Aksu Prefecture	阿克苏地区	2,530,506	2,030,600		162		2,030,762	80%		626,885
	Aksu City	阿克苏市	513,682	278,210		38		278,248	54%	0.2	55,650
	Awat County	阿瓦提县	262,842	217,722		6		217,728	83%	0.3	65,318
	Bay (Baicheng) County	拜城县	241,079	212,272		22		212,294	88%	0.3	63,688
	Kalpin (Keping) County	柯坪县	55,425	53,804		2		53,806	97%	0.4	21,522
	Kuchar (Kuche) County	库车县	492,535	440,125		58		440,183	89%	0.3	132,055
	Shayar (Shaya) County	沙雅县	274,382	230,129		2		230,131	84%	0.3	69,039
	Wensu County	温宿县	259,305	197,360		11		197,371	76%	0.3	59,211
	Uqturpan (Wushi) County	乌什县	235,336	216,579		12		216,591	92%	0.4	86,636
	Toksu (Xinhe) County	新和县	195,920	184,399		11		184,410	94%	0.4	73,764
Altay Prefecture	Altay Prefecture	阿勒泰地区	667,988	9,434		352,161		361,595	54%		73,094
	Altay City	阿勒泰市	231,466	4,890		79,626		84,516	37%	0.1	8,452
	Burqin County	布尔津县	72,378	1,008		41,583		42,591	59%	0.2	8,518
	Burultoqay (Fuhai) County	福海县	75,486	509		31,191		31,700	42%	0.1	3,170
	Fuyun County	富蕴县	97,113	1,929		71,384		73,313	75%	0.3	21,994
	Habahe County	哈巴河县	87,356	346		53,437		53,783	62%	0.2	10,757
	Jeminay (Jimunai) County	吉木乃县	38,899	194		24,849		25,043	64%	0.2	5,009
	Chinggil (Qinghe) County	青河县	65,290	558		50,091		50,649	78%	0.3	15,195
Bayingolin Prefecture	Bayingolin Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture	巴音郭楞蒙古自治州	1,393,812	440,283		1,289		441,572	32%		51,386
	Bohu County	博湖县	59,900	10,464		19		10,483	18%	0.05	524
	Hejing County	和静县	183,533	51,069		1,061		52,130	28%	0.05	2,607
	Heshuo County	和硕县	65,704	10,641		37		10,678	16%	0.05	534
	Korla City (Bayingholin)	库尔勒市	558,968	129,411		102		129,513	23%	0.05	6,476
	Luntai County	轮台县	146,219	95,078		8		95,086	65%	0.2	19,017
	Yanqi Hui Autonomous County	焉耆回族自治县	172,861	45,786		39		45,825	27%	0.05	2,291
	Charchan (Qiemo) County	且末县	69,464	50,754		3		50,757	73%	0.3	15,227
	Qaghilik (Ruo) County	若羌县	34,020	13,328		5		13,333	39%	0.1	1,333
	Lopnur (Yuli) County	尉犁县	103,143	33,752		15		33,767	33%	0.1	3,377
Bortala  Prefectue	Bortala Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture	博尔塔拉蒙古自治州	479,737	68,514		49,792		118,306	25%		5,912
	Alashankou City	阿拉山口市	1,716	40		24		64	4%	0	-
	Bole City	博乐市	258,002	44,749		21,022		65,771	25%	0.05	3,289
	Jinghe County	精河县	144,689	20,090		14,047		34,137	24%	0.05	1,707
	Arishang (Wenquan) county	温泉县	75,330	3,635		14,699		18,334	24%	0.05	917
Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture	Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture	昌吉回族自治州	1,392,762	68,144		146,831		214,975	15%		10,709
	Changji City	昌吉市	371,359	11,172		20,160		31,332	8%	0	-
	Fukang City	阜康市	166,955	10,835		15,331		26,166	16%	0.05	1,308
	Qutubi (Hutubi) County	呼图壁县	215,033	6,508		26,914		33,422	16%	0.05	1,671
	Jimsar County	吉木萨尔县	138,466	7,801		12,129		19,930	14%	0.05	997
	Manas County	玛纳斯县	174,206	6,224		19,306		25,530	15%	0.05	1,277
	Mori Kazakh Autonomous County	木垒哈萨克自治县	88,159	5,165		25,375		30,540	35%	0.1	3,054
	Qitai County	奇台县	238,584	20,439		27,616		48,055	20%	0.05	2,403
Hotan Prefecture	Hotan Prefecture	和田地区	2,324,287	2,248,113		113		2,248,226	97%		868,183
	Chira (Cele) County	策勒县	166,735	163,705		1		163,706	98%	0.4	65,482
	Hotan City	和田市	348,289	311,050		23		311,073	89%	0.3	93,322
	Hotan County	和田县	327,533	325,117		3		325,120	99%	0.4	130,048
	Lop (Luopu) County	洛浦县	287,590	282,513		31		282,544	98%	0.4	113,018
	Niya (Minfeng) County	民丰县	38,492	34,900		33		34,933	91%	0.4	13,973
	Karakash (Moyu) County	墨玉县	577,391	563,606		4		563,610	98%	0.4	225,444
	Guma (Pishan) County	皮山县	296,075	290,016				290,016	98%	0.4	116,006
	Keriye (Yutian) County	于田县	282,182	277,206		18		277,224	98%	0.4	110,890
Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture	Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture	伊犁哈萨克自治州	4,696,322	819,701		1,257,003		2,076,704	44%		368,220
	Qapqal (Xiba) County	察布查尔锡伯自治县	196,742	56,700		40,181		96,881	49%	0.1	9,688
	Tokkuztara (Gongliu) County	巩留县	203,492	47,571		63,108		110,679	54%	0.2	22,136
	Korgas (Huocheng) County	霍城县	413,758	94,946		37,878		132,824	32%	0.1	13,282
	Kuitun City	奎屯市	289,397	1,018		5,222		6,240	2%	0	-
	Nilqa (Nilek) County	尼勒克县	189,763	22,949		88,193		111,142	59%	0.2	22,228
	Tekes (Tekesi) County	特克斯县	174,883	20,010		76,904		96,914	55%	0.2	19,383
	Kunes (Xinyuan) County	新源县	321,739	34,001		150,145		184,146	57%	0.2	36,829
	Ghulja (Yining) City	伊宁市	587,507	264,534		26,863		291,397	50%	0.1	29,140
	Ghulja (Yining) County	伊宁县	439,179	207,446		54,533		261,979	60%	0.2	52,396
	Monggulküra (Zhaosu) County	昭苏县	187,710	18,938		94,120		113,058	60%	0.2	22,612
	Ili Prefecture directly under the county	伊犁州直属县(市)	3,004,170	768,113		637,147		1,405,260	47%	0.1	140,526
Karmay City	Karamay Prefectural City	克拉玛依市	299,720	46,575		12,281		58,856	20%		2,943
	Baijiantan District (Karamay)	白碱滩区	39,613	7,535		1,659		9,194	23%	0.05	460
	Dushanzi District	独山子区	57,852	9,415		2,658		12,073	21%	0.05	604
	Karamay District	克拉玛依区	200,078	29,259		7,912		37,171	19%	0.05	1,859
	Urho District	乌尔河区	2,177	366		52		418	19%	0.05	21
Kashgar Prefecture	Kashgar Prefecture	喀什地区	4,499,158	4,140,255		211		4,140,466	92%		1,561,127
	Maralbeshi (Bachu) County	巴楚县	382,186	363,488		8		363,496	95%	0.4	145,398
	Peyziwat (Jiashi) County	伽师县	445,846	437,073		13		437,086	98%	0.4	174,834
	Kashgar City	喀什市	628,302	534,848		98		534,946	85%	0.3	160,484
	Makit (Makati) County	麦盖提县	272,010	225,608		2		225,610	83%	0.3	67,683
	Yarkand (Shache) County	莎车县	851,374	818,379		10		818,389	96%	0.4	327,356
	Konasheher (Shufu) County	疏附县	277,877	271,556		7		271,563	98%	0.4	108,625
	Yengisheher (Shule) County	疏勒县	377,029	350,301		4		350,305	93%	0.4	140,122
	Tashkurgan Tajik Autonomous County	塔什库尔干塔吉克自治县	40,381	2,179		15		2,194	5%	0	-
	Qaghiliq (Yecheng) County	叶城县	519,962	490,417		31		490,448	94%	0.4	196,179
	Yengisar (Yingjisha) County	英吉沙县	302,542	297,290		14		297,304	98%	0.4	118,922
	Yopurgha (Yuepuhu) County	岳普湖县	177,955	167,860		2		167,862	94%	0.4	67,145
	Poskam (Zepu) County	泽普县	223,694	181,256		7		181,263	81%	0.3	54,379
Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture	Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture	克孜勒苏柯尔克孜自治州	596,064	389,437		172		389,609	65%		114,026
	Aheqi County	阿合奇县	44,656	1,193		39		1,232	3%	0	-
	Akto County	阿克陶县	221,526	161,687		29		161,716	73%	0.3	48,515
	Atush City	阿图什市	269,317	216,651		60		216,711	80%	0.3	65,013
	Uluqqat (Wuqia) County	乌恰县	60,565	9,906		44		9,950	16%	0.05	498
Kumul (Hami)	Kumul Prefectural City	哈密地区	616,711	109,072		55,550		164,622	27%		12,315
	Barkol Kazakh Autonomous County	巴里坤哈萨克自治县	104,459	142		38,189		38,331	37%	0.1	3,833
	Kumul (Hami) City	哈密市	488,964	99,036		12,804		111,840	23%	0.05	5,592
	Yiwu County	伊吾县	23,288	9,894		4,557		14,451	62%	0.2	2,890
Tacheng Prefecture	Tacheng Prefecture	塔城地区	1,024,164	42,154		267,695		309,849	30%		39,024
	Dorbiljin (Emin) County	额敏县	212,926	8,080		76,084		84,164	40%	0.1	8,416
	Hoboksar Mongol Autonomous County (Tacheng)	和布克赛尔蒙古自治县	55,046	1,079		15,533		16,612	30%	0.1	1,661
	Sawen (Shawan) County	沙湾县	206,318	9,406		37,824		47,230	23%	0.05	2,362
	Tacheng City	塔城市	168,742	5,081		27,731		32,812	19%	0.05	1,641
	Toli County	托里县	96,873	1,220		68,958		70,178	72%	0.3	21,053
	Wusu City	乌苏市	224,707	17,118		22,766		39,884	18%	0.05	1,994
	Qagantokay (Yumin) County	裕民县	59,552	170		18,799		18,969	32%	0.1	1,897
Turpan	Turpan Prefectural City	吐鲁番市	651,853	489,135		355		489,490	75%		146,847
	Gaochang District	高昌区	297,215	227,610		28		227,638	77%	0.3	68,291
	Piqan (Shanshan) County	鄯善县	230,598	165,086		39		165,125	72%	0.3	49,538
	Toksun County	托克逊县	124,040	96,439		288		96,727	78%	0.3	29,018
XPCC	XPCC	自治区直辖县级市	1,067,979	113,519		3,710		117,229	11%		20,209
	Aral City	阿拉尔市	179,214	6,036		28		6,064	3%	0	-
	Shihezi City	石河子市	632,606	6,380		3,583		9,963	2%	0	-
	Tumushuk	图木舒克市	163,101	101,042		1		101,043	62%	0.2	20,209
	Wujiaqu City	五家渠市	93,058	61		98		159	0%	0	-
Total			24,909,378	11,354,887		2,211,105		13,565,992	54%		3,928,790

 

 

 

Selected Satellite Images of Internment Camps

 

Moyu County, Kashgar Prefecture (coordinates: 39°21'33.1"N 75°51'50.0"E)
March 6, 2017	November 30, 2017
Yengisheher (Shule) County, Kashgar Prefecture (39°25'54.0"N 76°03'20.7"E)
May 8, 2017	September 19, 2017
Dabancheng, Urumqi City (43°23'01.8"N 88°17'18.2"E)
July 11, 2015	April 27, 2018
Akto County, Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture (39°08'52.5"N 75°57'08.0"E)
November 30, 2017
Karakash County, Hotan Prefecture (37°06'42.7"N 79°38'30.9"E)
March 2, 2016	January 20, 2018

 

 

 

 

 

 

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